Twelve Ways to Deceive, and Most of Them Aren't Lies

The most famous line in the first chapter of The Art of War is “All warfare is based on deception.” That is Lionel Giles’s 1910 translation. The Chinese is 兵者，诡道也. After it come twelve short instructions. Readers have long called them the twelve methods of deception.

It is easy to read the whole list as one idea: make the enemy believe something false. Psychologists have a classic test for understanding false beliefs. In 1983, Heinz Wimmer and Josef Perner published it in the journal Cognition. The title of their paper ends with the words “young children’s understanding of deception.”

The test is simple. A child watches a puppet named Maxi put some chocolate in a cupboard. Maxi leaves, and his mother moves the chocolate to another cupboard. Then the child is asked where Maxi will look for it. Young children point to where the chocolate really is. They do not yet understand that Maxi’s belief can be wrong. Most children pass this test only between the ages of four and six. To deceive someone, you need this understanding first.

Sun Tzu’s first four methods fit this idea well. In Giles’s words: “when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.” Each one changes what the enemy sees, so he gets one fact wrong: our ability to attack, our activity, or our distance.

A fifth method, 卑而骄之, does the same. Giles translates it as “pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.” In my field, communications engineering, we call this kind of thing spoofing. You send a false signal, and the receiver believes it.

The other seven methods are different. I find it useful to check them one by one, the way an engineer checks each input to a system.

Take 怒而挠之: “if your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him.” This gives the enemy no false belief. It makes him angry, and anger makes him think badly about whatever he sees. Two more methods work the same way: tire him out when he is rested, and split his forces when they are united. These methods do not change the enemy’s information. They change the enemy himself. In engineering terms, they attack the receiver, not the signal.

Another method, 利而诱之, says “hold out baits to entice the enemy.” The bait is usually something real, like supplies left behind. It works on what he wants. And two methods are not deception at all: “if he is secure at all points, be prepared for him; if he is in superior strength, evade him.” That is just being careful.

Translation also matters here. Giles translates 乱而取之 as “feign disorder, and crush him.” That would make it another false signal. But most modern translators read it differently: if the enemy is in disorder, take him. On that reading, it is not a lie. It means using a real weakness.

Here is the count. Five methods give the enemy a false picture. Three wear down the person who forms the picture. Two use a real desire or a real weakness. Two are simple caution. The heading is still fair in one way, because all twelve leave the enemy acting on a worse picture than he could have had. But they are not one method.

This matters because each kind needs a different defense. Against false signals, you compare one signal with another. An army that only looks far away still needs food, and its supply lines tell the truth. But when the attack is on the receiver, more information does not help, because the information was never the problem. An angry or tired general can see everything clearly and still make a bad decision.

So Sun Tzu’s list shows that a trap does not always need false beliefs. Sometimes it is enough to make the other side tired, proud, or angry, and let him use a true picture of the battle badly.